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Abstract 
This chapter will suggest that problems over the perception of the nature of hate crime 
mean that often victims of disablist hate crime are overlooked. Developed partly 
through campaign group activism and high profile cases, hate crime has become a 
solid part of criminal justice policy and practice.  The legal framework recognises 
different forms of crime motivated by prejudice or hostility towards victims based on 
their race, religion, sexual orientation, transgender identity and/or disability. However, 
this chapter will demonstrate that there are particular problems with the 
implementation of provisions related to disablist hate crime which can be understood 
by utilising Nils Christie’s ‘ideal victim’ typology. Born out of an identity politics which 
sought recognition for the specific harms of hate crime, the development of policy has 
been shaped by sometimes simplistic perceptions of what it is to be victimised. These 
have often been framed around issues of stranger danger and attributing recognition 
to ‘deserving victims’. This reliance on identity politics has often meant that victims of 
disablist hate crime are portrayed as weak and vulnerable, a situation which Christie 
suggests can contribute to anxiety and a questionable focus on the need for severe 
punishments. Fundamentally this chapter will show that Christie’s ideal victim thesis is 
relevant today, with an increasing emphasis on identity politics which is used to 
demonstrate that victims are both ‘deserving’ and ‘legitimate’. 
Introduction  
In July 2013 Bijan Ebrahimi was brutally murdered in Bristol, UK. The 44-year-old 
mentally disabled man, who had come to Britain as a refugee from Iran, had sought 
help from the police on a number of occasions because of the escalating harassment 
that he was receiving from neighbours. Members of the local community had accused 
him of being a paedophile after finding him taking photographs of young people who 
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he had thought were vandalising his hanging baskets. He was arrested but quickly 
released due to a lack of evidence. Ebrahimi telephoned the police the day after his 
release from arrest, saying: ‘My life is in danger. Right now a few of my neighbours 
are outside and shouting and calling me a paedophile. I need to see PC Duffy.’ 
(Peachey, The Independent, 2015). But PC Duffy did not attend, or even speak to 
Bijan, characterising him as an inconvenience and a nuisance. The next day Lee 
James, a local neighbour, dragged Ebrahimi from his home and kicked him until he 
was unconscious. James was then joined by another neighbour who poured white 
spirit over Ebrahimi and set him on fire. James was eventually convicted of murder 
and sentenced to life in prison while Stephen Norley, who set Ebrahimi alight, received 
a 4-year custodial sentence. As a result of failings leading up to the murder, eighteen 
police officers involved in the case also faced disciplinary proceedings; two officers 
were given prison sentences for failing to protect Bijan.  
The case presents a complex mix of factors which point towards the difficulties faced 
by victims of disablist hate crime, particularly those with mental disabilities or learning 
difficulties. In the above instance we see a criminal justice response which criminalises 
the victim (in that Ebrahimi was arrested on suspicion of paedophilic offences) and, 
once exonerated, fails to take the required action to protect a vulnerable person. 
Despite the repeated acts of hostility directed towards him, no prosecutions – including 
his eventual murder – were brought under the disability hate crime provisions. This 
case, as with others outlined in this chapter, illustrates a key area of concern to 
(disability) hate crime theorists: the arbitrary nature of criminal justice responses 
discerning between ‘disability hate crime’ and disabled persons being victims of (hate) 
crime. It would appear that the preference is to adopt the latter approach in a manner 
not fitting with other recognised forms of hate crime (in the UK, at least). In this chapter, 
an analysis of this differentiation invokes Christie’s (1986) ‘ideal victim’ framework to 
assess how the construction of the victim is key to the ensuing response granted to 
them. In order to not conflate the two approaches, the terminology ‘victims of disablist 
hate crime’ will be adopted rather than ‘disabled victims of hate crime’. This is to 
highlight the disablism of the hate crime perpetrator rather than disability of the victim 
which is to blame for the crime.  
The extent to which victims of disablist hate crime – that is, people who have been 
targeted for victimisation as a result of disablism – are victimised, overlooked and 
3 
 
underprotected is subject to a growing body of literature and research.  There is wide 
ranging evidence of the scale of the problem of disablist hate crime. The Crime Survey 
for England and Wales indicated that the 2015-16 rate of 3,629 was a 44% increase 
on the previous year (Home Office, 2016). Qualitative research demonstrates the 
dehumanising features of disablist hate crime, with victims often experiencing 
degrading treatment by perpetrators but also so-called ‘low level’ abuse which can 
continue over months and years (Roulstone and Sadique, 2013, Sin, 2015). Reports 
such as Scope’s ‘Getting Away with Murder’ (2008) or the European Human Rights 
Consortium’s ‘Hidden in Plain Sight” (2011) point towards how victims are ignored by 
the criminal justice system as well as by wider society. The common theme is that 
such violence is hidden, but also subject to systemic failures and institutional 
disablism. These barriers have real consequences for victims who then tend to 
normalise their experiences, thus not seek legal redress (Roulstone and Sadique, 
2013; Thorneycroft and Asquith, 2017). This also has an international commonality in 
that jurisdictions with hate crime provisions find that disability is one of the categories 
least likely to be reported to police (Sherry, 2010; Levin, 2013).  
Yet when using Nils Christie’s typology of the ideal victim, victims of disablist hate 
crime would appear to be a perfect fit for gaining policy and societal attention.  In his 
seminal piece he details particular attributes necessary for the construction of ideal 
victim status. These include: i) being weak; ii) carrying out a respectable project; iii) 
being without blame; iv) the offender is big and bad; v) the offender is unknown to the 
victim and vi) the victim is powerful enough to be heard but not too powerful so as to 
threaten ‘countervailing interests’ (Christie, 1986: 19-21). Such a typology speaks to 
original conceptions of victimology in terms of victim precipitation and proneness. But 
Christie is not making a moral judgment on the validity of the victim status, instead he 
is just pointing towards a particular social construction. Importantly, this is not a static 
notion because people can become ideal victims as they (or society) change. In this 
brief synopsis, the predicament of disabled victims of hate crime appears to be a good 
fit for his ideal victim thesis. They represent members of society who are perceived as 
being weaker (generally, and in comparison to their perpetrators), blameless (for their 
state of being and victim status) and for whom the offender might be unknown in many 
cases. Similarly, they lack the power to be a threat to the established order.  
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However, this surface level analysis belies a deeper structural problem in the 
recognition of victims of disablist hate crime as legitimate hate crime victims; this will 
be examined in this chapter which expands upon Christie’s piece by looking at the 
specific problems faced by victims who are not perceived as ‘ideal’ in several respects. 
By using the example of disability as a case study, I illustrate how ‘ideal victims’ need 
to be understood in the context of specific policy domains. In this regard, the hate 
crime discourse presents a useful example of the ways in which ideal victim groups 
are constructed through the process of policy formation. ‘Hate crime’ is the ultimate 
‘ideal victim’ crime in that legislative approaches have specified very particular groups 
of victims as worthy of the enhanced protection that such laws afford. However, within 
this construction there are more complicated attributes than Christie could have 
envisaged. Through an analysis of these, I aim to demonstrate that disabled victims 
of hate crime are perceived as inherently vulnerable and prone to victimisation, 
thereby ironically rendering them invisible in hate crime approaches (which proves 
redundant in attempting to enhance this construction of vulnerability further). 
Therefore, the chapter discusses the benefits and limitations of ‘ideal victim’ status for 
victims of disablist hate crime, and the sacrifices that must be made in this quest for 
recognition. 
Constructing hate crime policy  
Hate crime policies have become a common feature of many Western governments 
in recent decades. They have enabled states to send a positive message about values 
of tolerance and diversity to society generally and to minority groups specifically; 
particularly those who have been subject to victimisation. Although the exact wording 
and definitions of these policies differs in scope (both across strands and jurisdictions 
where they exist), they do share some features of note. First, they stipulate which 
forms of criminality will be recognised, for example assault, murder or criminal 
damage. Second, they tend to attach an enhanced criminal sanction in the form of an 
extended punishment. This is the declaratory function of hate crime laws and allows 
governments to demonstrate their tougher stance on certain crimes. Third, and the 
main focus of this chapter, they determine which groups of victims will be afforded said 
protections. The decision over which groups are included in hate crime laws can be 
understood in the context of the rising significance of identity politics and mobilising of 
different social movements seeking legal recognition. This has been informed by 
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various civil rights campaigns, feminist efforts and other victims’ rights groups; as a 
result, hate crime policy generally includes groups who have experienced a history of 
oppression and have gathered empirical evidence to demonstrate and document their 
experiences. Gail Mason adds that they also need to have made a moral or emotional 
claim and a consideration of ‘what these victim groups can do for the moral force of 
the law’ (Mason, 2013: 79). This in turn has led to claims of a victim ‘hierarchy’, where 
groups excluded from hate crime policy – or to whom hate crime resources are not 
appropriately utilised – feel disenfranchised. For example, groups such as the 
homeless are routinely targeted as victims of violence and prejudice but not afforded 
the protection of hate crime policy. Therefore, in order to be included in hate crime 
policy, victims must not only possess particular identity attributes for inclusion in 
recognised groups, but such groups need to be sufficiently cared about or influential 
to win over relevant policy makers.  
The rolling implementation of hate crime laws in Great Britain evidences this hierarchy 
somewhat. The UK has seen the steady advent and expansion of hate crime policy 
over the last twenty years. Mirroring developments in the United States, the initial 
legislative developments were framed with race as the first category enshrined in law. 
In Britain came about as a result of the racist murder of black teenager Stephen 
Lawrence in 1993, which prompted the New Labour government to enact a manifesto 
commitment to make racist violence a specific offence attracting an enhanced 
punishment (which they later did in 1997 after winning the general election). Religion 
was subsequently added as another category in 2001 after concerns about rising 
levels of Islamophobia in the UK following the 9/11 terror attacks in the United States.  
In this early formation it is noteworthy that cases of ‘stranger danger’ came to be 
predominantly associated with notions and definitions of hate crime, in that it was 
possible to determine the motive as the perpetrator did not have any other reason for 
the attack (Mason, 2005). The prejudicial motive – the ‘hate’ for a person’s identity – 
was determined to be what had caused the crime and thus warranted harsher than 
usual punishment. As such, key cases such as that of Stephen Lawrence (and, in 
2005, Anthony Walker – a black teenager murdered in Liverpool) came to be seen as 
archetypal hate crimes as a result of the attacks being committed by strangers to the 
victims. The connections here with Christie’s ideal victim typology – in that the image 
of the stranger is a key tenet – appear evident. However, if race and religion formed 
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the foundation of hate crime categories, and stranger violence the style in which this 
occurred, then the place of disability within provisions has been much more 
precarious.  
Writing ahead of changes to include other forms of identity within hate crime 
frameworks, Jenness and Grattet (2001) described disability as part of a ‘second tier’ 
of provisions which – at the time – was seen to potentially include sexual orientation, 
gender and age as similar categories. Unlike racially and religiously motivated 
offences, evidencing prejudice in crimes against these groups warranted harder work 
to gather the required empirical evidence needed to convince policymakers that hate 
crime definitions should extend to include them. Disability has now been included in 
the USA, UK (since 2003) and eight other Organization for Security and Co-operation 
in Europe (OSCE) countries. Inclusion in law is a start, but there is evidence to suggest 
that it has not been embraced to the fullest extent in terms of implementation. In 
2015/2016 the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) in England and Wales completed 
15,442 hate crime prosecutions. Of those, 941 were for disability hate crime; 75% 
resulted in a conviction which was around 8% lower than for other forms of hate crime. 
A further disparity was the extent to which Judges imposed a sentence uplift for cases 
of disability hate crime. This was only used in 11.9% of cases, compared with 37.8% 
for homophobic/transphobic and 34.8% in cases of racially or religiously aggravated 
crimes (CPS, 2016). Recent policy reviews admit that disability lags behind other hate 
crime victim groups in terms of reporting, service provision and appropriate protection 
(Justice Inspectorate, 2015). Despite policy attention now being paid to disablist hate 
crimes, they remain ‘cellophane crimes’ in that ‘people walk right through them, look 
right through them, and never know they are there’ (Sherry, 2002: 1).   
A key theme running throughout the literature on victims of disablist hate crime is the 
extent to which they are viewed not as victims of hostility, but as victims of their 
inherent vulnerability. As Roulstone and Sadique (2013) note, there exists an 
assumption that disabled people are easy targets. This is borne partly from a history 
of medical models around disability but also previous policy which has sought to utilise 
a social care rather than criminal justice response. Disabled people have needed to 
be ‘protected’ from themselves, from society and from the dangerous criminal ‘other’. 
This means that – within a hate crimes framework – rather than being embraced within 
the identity politics demand for a greater legal recognition of prejudice-motivated 
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crimes, disabled people have instead been included as a result of wider social policies 
seeking enhanced safeguarding measures. In other words, the rhetoric surrounding 
disablist hate crime was more about promoting victim protection than punishing 
offender prejudice. Relating disablist hate crime to Christie’s model, the ‘ideal victim’ 
relies upon understanding how the victim is constructed in relation to particular 
policies. Hate crime policy has developed in a specific way: around key ‘figurehead 
cases’ (those which tend to attract a high level of media attention), relating to ‘stranger 
danger’, reflecting campaigners’ efforts, demarcating groups worthy of protection etc. 
While an initial viewing of disabled hate crime victims might see them fit within the 
typology that Christie puts forward, considering this in conjunction with hate crime 
policy paints a much more complex picture. This analysis will now move on to a more 
detailed analysis of each attribute that Christie details in order to demonstrate this 
complexity.  
The Victim’s Weakness  
Christie’s first attribute is that the victim is weak. He stipulates that the ‘sick, old or very 
young are particularly well suited as ideal victims’ (p19). Furthermore, this weakness 
is particularly relative to the strength of the offender. Christie is not more specific about 
why this weakness is significant, but one might infer that this is because, a) there might 
be increased harm and fear caused when a victim is weaker; and, b) it makes the 
criminal act more serious because they are selecting an easy target.  Victims of 
disablist hate crime might appear to be ideal victims in this regard, potentially lacking 
the physical or mental strength to defend themselves. As Hughes (2009) notes, this 
perception is based on an immediate visual appearance whereby the ‘strong, well-
formed, non-disabled, masculine body is the benchmark and against this benchmark 
a woman is found wanting and a disabled person – man or woman – is weak and 
vulnerable’. Popular discourse around disabled people has often portrayed them as 
having a ‘spoiled identity’ and as facing stigma and abuse relating to their disability 
(Simcock and Castle, 2016: 19). As such they might be viewed as being weaker than 
the ‘normal’ (i.e. non-disabled) population. However, when examining the hate crime 
domain there are further complicating factors. Although disabled people might 
experience prejudice related to perceptions of their weakness, this is somewhat 
different from other hate crime victims. It is quite unusual for hate crime victims to be 
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seen as inherently weaker than (their) perpetrators. If we examine the case of Stephen 
Lawrence, who was murdered in a racist attack, he was not portrayed as being weak. 
Instead, the focus is on the perpetrator’s motive which, in turn, is about hostility 
towards the victim’s identity.  
In 2006, James Wheatley was jailed for 23 years for murdering Lee Irving, a mentally 
disabled man with learning difficulties. Wheatley repeatedly kicked and stamped on 
Lee in a number of attacks over nine days, eventually killing him. Three others were 
convicted for their role of helping to cover up the murder. Yet despite the police and 
Crown Prosecution Service submitting evidence that it was a disablist hate crime, the 
Judge dismissed this in his sentencing remarks: 
“In my judgement you were motivated in his offence not by hostility towards 
those with disability but by your vicious and bullying nature which particularly 
takes advantage of those who are unable to or less able to resist.” (Kennedy, 
2016). 
Irving’s family disputed this perspective, arguing that it was a hate crime because of 
the dehumanising language that they used during the attack which was demonstrative 
of hostility based on disability. It appears that for ‘ideal victims’ of disability hate crime, 
being seen as weak suggests a crime of a different nature; one where victimisation 
has occurred as a result of being seen as an easy target rather than due to hostility 
towards the victim’s identity. As such, this negates complexity of (the offender’s) 
motive, which the ideal victim framework does not allow for in hate crime cases.  
Engagement in a Respectable Project 
The second attribute that Christie describes is arguably rather opaque. He states that 
victims should be carrying out a respectable project and gives the example of a woman 
caring for her sister. As a counter to this, he suggests the case of a young man who 
gets attacked whilst ‘hanging around’ in a bar and says that he is ‘far from ideal’ (p19).  
Van Wijk (2013: 163) suggests that in reality, the young man in the bar would be 
viewed rather neutrally in contemporary society and that a man about to commit a 
crime might be a more useful interpretation of someone doing a disrespectful project. 
Many hate crime victims – particularly those who receive public attention and 
sympathy – are described as being engaged in neutral or respectful activities either 
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before or at the time of their attack. For example, much attention was paid to the 
Christian background of Stephen Lawrence’s family and that he wanted to become an 
architect (Cottle, 2004). Similarly, Jody Dobrowski was a young gay man for whom 
‘life was good’ and ‘had everything to live for’ when he was brutally murdered in a 
homophobic attack in London in 2005 (Foufas, 2015). Jody had been walking home 
from work and was set upon by two men who beat him so severely that he had to be 
identified by his fingerprints. Sentencing his killers to 28 years in prison, Judge Brian 
Barker noted that they had only one motive and that it was ‘Jody's tragic misfortune to 
cross [their] path’. This interpretation of Christie’s ‘respectable project’ suggests that 
the victims – who were going about their daily activities when attacked – would have 
otherwise had the potential to make a contribution to wider society.  
For victims of disablist hate crime, there are unique factors linked to this aspect of the 
ideal victim typology which make its application more complex. For a start, there is a 
long history of stereotyping the disabled and viewing their mere existence as 
problematic, wounded or monstrous (Butler, 2009). As Anne Novis notes ‘negative 
stereotypes towards disabled people start before birth, via segregation into day 
centres, residential homes, special schools and specialist employment’ (Novis, 2013: 
121). As such their lives do not exist; they are devalued or seen as burdensome. The 
label of vulnerability, so readily applied in policy contexts, is also emblematic of the 
burden disabled people place on local services. Roulstone and Sadique points 
towards the various safeguarding schemes which could risk ‘disabled people losing, 
rather than gaining independence’ (Roulstone and Sadique, 2013: 32). Negatively 
perceiving disabled people as ‘abject’ in terms of societal norms and values in turn 
impacts on their being able to engage in ‘respectable projects’ (Thorneycroft and 
Asquith, 2017). Furthermore, recent popular discourse in the UK around Fit for Work 
schemes, coupled with cuts to Disability Living Allowance, fuel prejudices about 
disabled people being a drain on resources and therefore unlikely to be seen as 
carrying out any sort of respectable or worthwhile endeavours. The little old lady in 
Christie’s example is depicted as caring for her sister, thereby making a contribution 
to society. In disability hate crimes, the victims are more likely to be considered the 
‘sister’ in that they are being cared for. This means that within Christie’s framework 




Christie suggests that to be granted ideal victim status, victims must be blameless in 
what happened to them. If individuals have a more ambiguous status, then they are 
less likely to be seen as victims (Bouris, 2007). Van Wijk (2013: 164) invokes the ‘just 
deserts’ theory to explain why people need to believe that bad things only happen to 
bad people. This in turn generates empathy towards the innocent victim, who we care 
about and can see as deserving of our concern. Cases with these qualities tend to 
attract a high level of media attention, which Thorneycroft and Asquith (2017) refer to 
as ‘figurehead crimes’. Often, the reporting emphasizes the victim’s ‘innocence’ and 
‘normality’ which renders them a sympathetic figure. The homophobic murder of 
Mathew Shepard in the United States is one such example they invoke to demonstrate 
the power of a figurehead crime. In this case, the murder, combined with a cultural 
shift towards increasing equality for gay people’s rights, meant Mathew’s case was 
afforded a lot of attention both in policy terms (resulting in legislative changes) and in 
the press.  
For victims of disability hate crime, their liability for being victimised sometimes lies in 
their gullibility. In 2006, Kevin Davies, a young man with epilepsy was murdered by 
three people who called themselves his friends. They had taken advantage of Kevin, 
forcing him to wear a dog collar and leash, stealing from him and abusing him over a 
period of time. Kevin was imprisoned by the group for 4 months before they killed him, 
yet when the perpetrators were convicted the judge described Kevin as being 
‘vulnerable, gullible and naïve’ (Quarmby, 2011: 182). Similar themes have emerged 
in other cases. Brent Martin, who had learning difficulties, was killed by a group of 
young people who had befriended him in order to have him to carry out petty crimes 
on their behalf over a sustained period of time. On the night he was murdered, the 
group chased him through the streets, periodically assaulting Brent before finally 
beating him unconscious. The final blow was delivered to his prone body, whereupon 
they stripped him from the waist down to further humiliate Brent. At the trial, his family 
talked about how he had often been ‘blamed for the misdeeds of others’, as the judge 
again pointed out his gullibility at having been taken advantage of (Quarmby, 2011: 
182).  
Katharine Quarmby’s analysis of disablist hate crime provides a detailed assessment 
of the many ways that targeted violence against disabled people has been ignored. 
She points out that disabled people have long been criminalised by the criminal justice 
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system, so it is unsurprising that blame is apportioned to them. Aside from being naïve, 
Quarmby also notes the number of disabled people who are accused of being 
paedophiles and sex offenders, as in the aforementioned case of Bijam Ibrahimi. This 
pattern of false accusations for some disabled people creates an obscured image of 
them as potentially to blame for their victimisation and thus not able to embody 
Christie’s required notion of ‘blamelessness’.  
The Big and Bad Offender  
In Christie’s typology, aspects of the offender’s identity are stipulated which contribute 
towards perceptions of the victim’s status. The (masculinised) offender is described 
as ‘big and bad’ in relation to the (feminised) weak and blameless victim. For hate 
crimes, the most exceptional and potentially straightforward cases tend to attract more 
attention in the popular media. This is because they play into the storyline narrative of 
an ideal crime, where there is no ambiguity about the offender’s culpability. In addition, 
the idea that a person could be attacked purely because of a prejudice towards their 
identity underscores the offences as a particularly heinous and evil form of crime. Van 
Wijk notes that ‘we have an intrinsic willingness to believe that people who commit 
such acts differ fundamentally from us’ (2013: 165) and Christie’s assertion that an 
ideal offender is ‘a human being close to not being one’ (p26). It is this ‘evil’ element 
– the intent – which hate crime legislation specifically recognises; perpetrators are 
considered to require harsher punishments as victims suffer more harm (Iganski, 
2008).  
For disablist hate crime, there are complicating factors surrounding the majority of 
offenders which makes it difficult to conceive of them as ‘big and bad’. First, evidence 
suggests that the age profile of perpetrators is younger than for other forms of hate 
crime. Crown Prosecution Service data from 2015/16 showed that 19.6% of 
defendants were aged 18-24 years old, and 9.6% were 14-17 years old. Most 
defendants in disablist hate crime cases were men (75.3%), but there were a 
significantly higher proportion of women (24.5%) compared to other strands of hate 
crime (17.1% in racially and religiously aggravated hate crime and 16.5% in 
homophobic and transphobic hate crime) (CPS, 2017). In cases of disablist hate crime, 
while the actions taken may be particularly heinous, the offender(s) may not come 
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across as such. Therefore, it is harder to discern a specific ‘big and bad’ offender who 
can be seen as evil and different from everyone else. 
The case of Fiona Pilkington and her daughter Francecca Hardwick is an example of 
the difficulty in discerning offenders in disablist hate crime cases. Fiona and her 
daughter had endured years of abuse, much of which was directed towards Francecca 
who had a learning disability, from people described mostly as ‘yobs’ and ‘youths’ in 
media depictions of the case. Despite calling the police on no fewer than 38 occasions, 
no action was taken by the police, thus the harassment continued. Eventually, in 2007, 
Fiona drove herself and her daughter to a secluded area and set fire to the car, killing 
them both. The sustained nature and multitude of offenders involved in this case made 
discerning a clear motivation difficult. Nonetheless, a jury in the inquest found that the 
lack of police action and failure of local authorities to act had had a significant impact 
on Fiona’s decision to take such drastic action (Quarmby, 2011). The failure of various 
institutions to respond appropriately to victims of hate crime means that they are 
effectively victimised again by the support services that let them down.  
The Unknown Offender  
Christie argues that an absence of any familiarity between victim and offender is a key 
attribute in granting ideal victim status. Specifically, there should be no prior personal 
relationship between victim and offender (p19). Christie does not specify why this is 
such a key attribute but given his other definitions one could infer that it is about the 
simplicity of motivation and ability not to assign any blame to the victim. Furthermore, 
the absence of information about the offender allows for the construction of a 
‘dehumanized picture…the more foreign the better’ (p29).  This is in keeping with the 
early victimology literature which takes a positivist stance and looks to the image of 
the stranger as a being the ultimate ‘baddy’. Similarly, a key criticism of hate crime as 
a concept has been that it has too readily relied upon images of the stranger which 
have perpetuated the idea that offences are rare and extraordinary. Kielinger and 
Stanko (2002: 5) suggested that this ‘places the responsibility for the violence on 
strangers and therefore on individual rather than society as a whole’.  In fact for many 
victims, experiences of hate crime are a daily, normal occurrence but when ‘hatred 
intersects with the known we prefer to blame the social relationships of the known for 
fuelling the individual act of violence’ (Stanko, 2001: 327). Nevertheless, high profile 
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cases of hate crimes committed by offenders who were strangers to the victim have 
come to characterise everyday understandings about the nature of victimisation. 
The relationship between victim and offender might therefore present a problem in 
attributing ideal victim status for many forms of hate crime. However, for victims of 
disablist hate crime, research suggests that this problem is more acute. Aside from 
the high proportion of victims who know the offender either as a neighbour or friend, 
they might also be a carer. In 2001, an undercover documentary broadcast by the BBC 
exposed a shocking regime of abuse of disabled residents in a private hospital called 
Winterbourne View. Secret footage had been captured of people being taunted, jeered 
at, dragged across the floor and abused. In his analysis, Chih Hoong Sin noted the 
shock that was expressed by politicians and the public alike and that in this case the 
criminal justice system did respond and prosecute the offenders for disablist hate 
crime (Sin, 2015 108).  However, critics have argued that much of this abuse never 
reaches the courts because it happens in an institutional setting. This, combined with 
a perception that being a carer is a difficult and unskilled job with few rewards 
sometimes leads to a level of sympathy more directed towards the perpetrators. The 
isolation of a disabled person who relies upon their carer leads to a level of complexity 
which is difficult to square with the ideal victim concept.  
A further particular phenomenon related to disabled victims is that of so-called ‘mate 
crime’.  Described by Pam Thomas (2013: 136) as ‘hostile incidents carried out by one 
or more people the disabled person considers to be their friends or relatives’, it is a 
particular feature of this strand of hate crime victims. Interpersonal relationships are 
often deliberately cultivated by the offenders to exploit the venerability that they see in 
the victim and also a lack of support structures in place to assist the disabled person 
(2013: 139).  Raymond Atherton is an example of a disabled man who was ‘befriended’ 
in this way by a group of teenagers who would steal from him, eat his food and take 
his money. He had few people to tell about what was happening and said he would 
rather have the company of someone than no-one (Thomas, 2013: 143).  It later 
emerged that many agencies with whom Raymond was in contact knew of the abuse; 
despite him moving house, the abuse continued up until the point of his eventual 
murder. His two young killers, aged 17 and 15 at the time were sentenced to 3 and a 
half years and 3 years in prison respectively (Quarmby, 2011: 103). In sum, the 
relationship between victim and offender in cases of disablist hate crime is seen as a 
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complex mix of institutional and societal failings. The deliberate targeting is somehow 
different from the random attack the Christie envisages and one to which a level of 
understanding has to be extended to the perpetrators who might also have been failed 
by the system. Although this does not necessarily mean that offenders go unpunished, 
it does mean disabled victims are less likely to be seen as ‘ideal’ and for sentence 
enhancements to be used.  
Power and Influence  
The final attribute that Christie puts forward relates to the power and influence of victim 
groups in gaining ideal victim status. This is balanced by being weak enough not to be 
a threat to other interests (p21). In their examination of the construction of policy 
design, Schneider, Ingram and deLeon note that some groups have access and 
resources to influence and shape policy which allows them to be seen as worthy 
recipients of protection. This is about how groups are seen as having the right amount 
of sympathy and pity, the ‘lack of political power sharply curtails their receipt of 
benefits...they do not have a strong role in the creation of national wealth, dependents 
are viewed as ‘good’ people but considerably less deserving of actual investments 
than advantaged people’ (Schneider et al, 2014: 112).  This is of particular relevance 
to hate crime policy, where critics have argued that a victim hierarchy has been 
created, precisely because of the reliance on campaign group activists in the 
construction of legislation. As the author found in previous research, a frustration for 
campaigners has been the extent to which policymakers rely upon them to gather 
evidence and push for legal recognition (Mason-Bish, 2010). The costs and manpower 
involved with this means that smaller and less well funded organisations struggle to 
have a role in the construction of hate crime policy and therefore, what ideal victims 
might look like.  
As with the other victim attributes that Christie notes, research has demonstrated the 
difficulties for victims of disablist hate crime in establishing themselves as important 
enough to count. Similarly, smaller disabled people’s organisations do not necessarily 
have direct access to government officials but have often relied upon larger charities 
who (arguably) had less involvement with victims themselves (Mason-Bish, 2010).  In 
an age of budget cuts and with so many other social problems to deal with, it is 
unsurprising the disabled people’s organisations have found it difficult to push for the 
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adequate implementation of hate crime provisions. Anne Novis notes that this struggle 
was partly about being included in policy discussions but also in ensuring that they 
catered adequately for the needs of disabled people (Novis, 2013: 119).  
A further point is the extent to which disabled victims evoke sufficient compassion and 
sympathy as to warrant a response. In her examination of emotions and hate crime 
law, Gail Mason suggests that this is essential because people must feel an obligation 
to resist prejudice against that group because ‘familiarity breeds compassion’ (Mason, 
2013: 85). They need to possess the ‘right amount of vulnerability, blamelessness and 
proximity to engender compassionate thinking’ (p86). This can be about not having 
empirical credibility, being blameworthy or simply too different and strange to ‘invite 
concern’. Disabled victims might therefore not meet the criteria of being viewed with 
enough sympathy because as we have seen they might be considered as partly to 
blame due to gullibility, or people may disbelieve the scale of the abuse they suffer. 
However, most potent is the claim that they are too strange, an argument supported 
by Thorneycroft and Asquith (2017). In their recent piece they query why so few cases 
of disablist hate crime achieve ‘figurehead status’, despite the undisputed horrors that 
disabled people have suffered. They suggest that it is because the victims are ‘abject’ 
in that their existence and bodies are deemed less than human. The narrative of social 
policy has been about detecting and treating disabled people for their conditions, 
proposing abortions or mercy killings for people deemed defective.  Anne Novis argues 
that these messages are endorsed by government policies on benefit cuts which 
perpetuate a narrative that disabled people are a burden on the state (Novis, 2013: 
119). The nature of hate crimes against disabled people often shows elements of this 
dehumanisation in the way that they are enslaved and tortured as being less than 
human (Quarmby, 2011).  
Constructing Deserving Victims  
This chapter has so far demonstrated the problems for victims of disablist hate crime 
in terms of gaining recognition using Christie’s ‘ideal victim’ typology. I would now like 
to take this analysis further, by discussing the advantages of being an ‘ideal victim’ of 
hate crime.  This is something about which Christie is rather ambiguous and he only 
implies what type of benefits a victim can expect to receive and that they may lead to 
calls for ‘further measures’ (p28).  For hate crime, these measures include additional 
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victim support and the potential to punish a perpetrator more harshly.  However, as I 
have demonstrated, not all groups are treated equally and victims of disablist hate 
crime have struggled to be seen as ‘ideal’ in this context. Despite this, there are 
potential benefits for focusing on hate crime as a way to challenge perceptions of 
disability. As Chih Hoong Sin (2015: 101) notes, there has been an historic tendency 
to view disabled people as being at risk of violence because of their disability. This 
creates an inertia in policy responses which assume that the best outcome is to protect 
disabled people from the abuse that their disability causes. This notion of inherent 
vulnerability evokes negative and paternalistic assumptions which point towards a 
need to care for or treat disabled people instead of giving them full access to criminal 
justice responses. So although not seen as ‘ideal’ in Christie’s formation it is worth 
challenging and contesting what could be described as the ‘dominant culture’s 
demeaning picture of the group’ (Fraser, 2000,109). This speaks towards how in the 
construction of social problems, identity politics has often sought to have forms of 
violence recognised in very particular ways and as Barbara Perry has noted, ‘rights 
claims embedded in hate crime legislation can be powerfully transformative 
discourses’ (Perry, 2002: 488).  
Furthermore, the ideas of vulnerability and presumed weakness are connected to 
medical models of disability tied to notions of biological pathology. Instead, being 
recognised as victims of hate crime rather than victims of disability offer a greater 
connection with issues of discrimination and structural inequality. As Tom 
Shakespeare notes ‘The achievement of the disability movement has been to break 
the link between our bodies and our social situation and to focus on the real cause of 
disability, i.e. discrimination and prejudice’ (1992: 40). So to be seen as worthy of 
protection in hate crime policy is to counter the fixation on inherent vulnerability which 
could lead to suggestions that disabled people are less than full human beings and so 
less worthy of full citizenship rights (Hughes, 2009). In the politics of recognition, it is 
better to be seen as an ideal victim of hate crime than an ideal victim of disability.  This 
is why campaigners have been so vociferous in their assertion that disablism must be 




Christie’s classic typology draws upon notions of weakness; blame; evil and stranger 
danger in order to demonstrate which groups of people are most likely to be given the 
legitimate status of ‘ideal victim’. In this chapter I have applied the typology to victims 
of disablist hate crime. In doing so, I have demonstrated that it is necessary to 
understand his work within a particular policy context as legislation is framed around 
constructions of crime which might have their own attributes. In itself the case study 
of hate crime is an interesting one. It takes a particular policy response to victimisation 
and through social movement campaigns and policymaking efforts has created a 
specific set of deserving and undeserving victims. Many groups – older people, the 
homeless, sex workers – have not fitted with the general ideal victim typology and so 
have been left outside of policy efforts. Others – such as disabled people have been 
included but have had problems having policy implemented. I argue here that this is 
because of the clash of ideal victims generally and the construction of ideal victims in 
specific policy. For hate crime, we have seen a concept emerge which has often relied 
upon notions of stranger danger; of simple motivations and of victim blamelessness. 
These have been relayed to the public through the media to garner support. However, 
disability has had a more difficult journey in that victims are seen as less sympathetic 
and more complicated to be ‘true’ hate crime victims. This has meant that the benefits 
of being an ideal victim in terms of sentence enhancement and victim support have 
often been lacking. Worse than this, it has meant that ‘endemic low aspirations for 
such groups lead to fatalistic acceptance that disabled people cannot expect anything 
different’ (Sin, 2015: 101) 
The examination of disabled victims also leads us towards some unpalatable truths. 
The historic treatment of disabled people has focused on medical concerns around 
the pathological body. Policy has tended to see the disability as the offender, the ‘thing’ 
that causes the problems and limitations. Disabled people are victims of their disability 
rather than attitudes and discrimination. As such issues of gullibility have often been 
used to excuse victimisation, with often a reliance on blaming a lack of treatment or 
appropriate care rather than encouraging access to justice. This ‘disagnostic 
overshadowing’ (Sin, 2015) is further complicated by the ‘abject’ nature of disabled 
people that renders them invisible to the criminal justice system.  The ideal victim 
typology reminds us of the need to challenge popular discourse around victims of 
crime. The justice system is slowly acknowledging the specific nature of the victim 
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experience and has published guidance which recognises the phenomenon of ‘mate 
crime’, the problems of assumed vulnerability and the role of society in challenging 
this. Campaigners feel that they are being heard more by policymakers (Novis, 2013; 
Brookes, 2013). However, we have to acknowledge our own role in the construction 
of ideal victims and the extent to which we accept or challenge these ideas.  
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